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 UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND WRONGLY PAID TAX
 Boake Allen Limited v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2006]
 EWCA Civ 25 concerned early payment of Advance Corporation
 Tax ("ACT"). ACT was normally payable when a company paid
 dividends to its shareholders, but there was a statutory exception
 where the company was a subsidiary of a United Kingdom
 company and both the parent and subsidiary made a group income
 election. If the tax authorities accepted the election, the obligation
 to pay ACT would only accrue when the parent company paid
 dividends. Section 247 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act
 1988 ("ICTA") stipulated that group income elections were only
 available to subsidiaries of United Kingdom companies. This
 provision was successfully challenged in Hoechst v. Attorney
 General [2001] S.T.C. 452 (noted by Virgo, (2002) 1 B.T.R. 4) as
 breaching the right of freedom of establishment enshrined in the
 EC treaty. In the aftermath of Hoechst, many claims for
 overpayment and/or premature payment of ACT followed. One of
 these was Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v. IRC [2005] EWCA Civ 78,
 [2005] S.T.C. 329 (noted by Hedley [2005] C.L.J. 296), involving a
 German subsidiary, which recognised that a claim for restitution lay
 in such circumstances, with the ground of restitution being an
 unlawful demand for tax rather than payment of tax pursuant to a
 mistake of law.
 Boake is slightly different from Deutsche Morgan Grenfell in that
 the claimants were subsidiaries of non-European entities. The
 demand for early payment of ACT was alleged to be (1) a breach
 of relevant Double Taxation Conventions; and (2) a breach of
 Article 56 of the EC Treaty. The claimants asserted a claim for
 interest on the tax paid prematurely on the ground of an unlawful
 demand for tax and/or a mistake of law. The Court of Appeal
 (Lloyd, Sedley and Mummery L.JJ.) dismissed the claim. Lloyd L.J.
 found that the relevant provisions of the Double Taxation
 Conventions were not incorporated into the domestic laws of the
 United Kingdom. Also, he held that in this context there was no
 breach of the EC Treaty and hence no unlawful tax demand.
 Mummery L.J. found no element of an unlawful demand because
 the claimant had not made a group income election, so ACT was
 due. Thus, the demand (if any) for the tax was not unlawful since
 the tax was lawfully due. Among the three judges, only Mummery
 LJ. appeared prepared to allow a restitutionary claim based on a
 claim for interest on money prematurely paid if there was an
 unlawful demand. The other two judges were more circumspect on
 this point. Lloyd L.J. said that such a claim was difficult to
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 reconcile with prior decisions (e.g., Pintada [1985] 1 A.C. 104 and
 Westdeutsche [1996] A.C. 669) whereas Sedley L.J. highlighted the
 fact that the tax was in fact due because no group income election
 had been made.
 Boake contains some interesting dicta on the law of unjust
 enrichment. Both Sedley and Mummery L.JJ. confirmed the
 Deustche Morgan Grenfell decision that a restitutionary claim based
 on mistake of law was inappropriate since the only ground for
 restitution was an unlawful demand for tax. This holding is
 significant because the former claim has a longer limitation period
 than the latter. Therefore, a claimant is not entitled to maintain an
 alternative mistake of law claim in circumstances like the present in
 order to enjoy a longer limitation period. Mummery L.J. criticised
 the whole enterprise of searching for a mistake of law in this claim
 and said it was arguable that the true foundation of the claim lies
 in the absence of basis for the payment. Another noteworthy point
 in this case was Sedley L.J.'s observation that the law of restitution
 is a residual remedy to distribute loss among parties whose rights
 are not met by some other stronger doctrine of law.
 The confirmation of Deutche Morgan Grenfell's holding that a
 claimant must rely on an unlawful demand as a reason for
 restitution rather than a mistake of law is a welcome development.
 This is because this approach allows the court to address directly
 the public law policies surrounding such cases rather than simply
 allowing the claim using a mechanical application of mistake of law
 as a ground of restitution (see Williams, [2005] K.C.L.J. 194; cf.
 Virgo, (2005) 3 B.T.R. 281). In confronting the public law aspect of
 such tax cases, two pressing issues need to be resolved in future
 cases: first, whether a special public law defence such as a
 disruption to public funds ought to be developed, and secondly,
 whether the time bar for a claim based on an unlawful demand for
 taxes should be altered to take into account the public law
 dimension of the case. It might very well be that there should be a
 longer time bar in cases where the unlawful demand is in breach of
 EC law (cf Buxton L.J.'s analysis in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v.
 IRC [2005] EWCA Civ 78 at [287]). On the facts, these issues did
 not arise because the demand was not unlawful under domestic or
 EC law. Also, if there was indeed an unlawful demand, Mummery
 L.J.'s robust approach in allowing a claim for interest on an
 advanced payment of tax is to be preferred. Otherwise, a taxpayer
 is left without a satisfactory remedy in cases where the authorities
 unlawfully demand a tax before it is lawfully due. As shown in this
 case, the interest lost on such an alleged early payment can be quite
 substantial.
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 More generally, Mummery L.J.'s observation that the true
 foundation of the claim lies in an absence of basis of the payment
 is also important. This is in line with Birks' thesis that the law of
 unjust enrichment ought to be re-oriented from the current "unjust
 factor" approach to a single master unjust factor, i.e., "absence of
 basis" (see Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon 2005)).
 Unfortunately, Mummery L.J.'s terse statement on this point does
 not inform us whether such a re-orientation of the law should take
 place. Finally, Sedley L.J.'s observation that the primary aim of
 unjust enrichment is to distribute losses among parties is also
 potentially significant. If mistakes are seen as a form of accident,
 then the law of unjust enrichment becomes an exercise in how the
 social costs of mistakes should be fairly distributed (see Dagan, The
 Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge 2004), pp. 37-82). This
 could affect rules of liability for mistaken payments and the defence
 of change of position.
 Tang Hang Wu
 STRICT FIDUCIARY LOYALTY AND ACCOUNTS OF PROFITS
 The Murad sisters entered into a joint venture with Al-Saraj to
 purchase a hotel in Clapham. In negotiating the deal they relied
 wholly on the advice and expertise of Al-Saraj, who consequently
 was found to have owed them fiduciary duties. Al-Saraj
 fraudulently represented that his contribution to the purchase price
 would be £500,000 in cash; he deliberately deceived the Murads by
 concealing the fact that his "contribution" was in fact made by
 offsetting unenforceable obligations owed to him by the vendor of
 the hotel, including a sum of £369,000 which represented
 commission paid by the vendor to Al-Saraj for introducing the
 purchasers. Al-Saraj thereby committed a clear breach of fiduciary
 duty. The Court of Appeal held Al-Saraj liable to account for his
 capital profits when the hotel was later sold at a profit: Murad v.
 Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [2005] W.T.L.R. 1573.
 The issue that exercised the Court of Appeal was the extent of
 that liability to account. Under the joint venture agreement, any
 capital profit made on resale of the hotel was to be split equally
 between Al-Saraj on the one hand and the Murads on the other.
 Had Al-Saraj disclosed the true facts, the trial judge found that the
 Murads would still have proceeded with the joint venture but
 would have insisted upon a greater share of the capital profits for
 themselves. Al-Saraj appealed against the trial judge's order that he
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